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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 740

Accident time: 10:37

Accident Date: 13/12/2010

Where it occurred: AF/2401/21529, MF613, Khushab area,
Kandahar province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
CBDT
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
use of pick (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-01 DMINING ACCIDENT
[CBDT – Community Based Demining Team]
INTRODUCTION:
The demining accident investigation team was convened by AMAC South to investigate and
find out the causes of demining accident involving Victim No.1] and Mr.[Victim No.2] the deminer and Section Leader of [Demining group] CBDT-01. The accident occurred on 13 Dec
2010 at 10:37 in task # AF/2401/21529/MF-613 located in Khushab area of Kandahar
province.
SUMMARY:
The above mentioned task is located in the southwest of Kandahar Airfield (KAF). This area
was heavily mined by Russian forces. The AP mines (POMZ and PMN) are laid in four rows
as belts surrounding the KAF in order to secure their positions from the attacks of
Mujahideen.
On the 13th Dec 2010 at 10:37, the deminer [Victim No.1] was operating in his clearance lane
excavating a detected signal, his prodder touched on a subsurface tripwire of POMZ mine
which caused it to explode. According to the investigation report the signal was not pinpointed
correctly and the de-miner has used pick in contrary to set procedure, during the excavation,
he pulled the subsurface tripwire connected with POMZ mine. The accident resulted in
superficial injuries to deminer’s hands, left thigh and left side of abdomen.
The report also adds that the Section Leader [Victim No.2] has also got some superficial
injuries on the right side of his body. He was busy in other clearance lane around 10 metres
away from the first victim deminer. He was removing bushes and other obstacle from a
clearance lane.
As the de-miner and section leader had not used PPE (vest & apron) correctly during the
clearance operations, therefore they got multiple injuries.
This is the second demining accident occurred in the same task, this accident clearly
indicates lack of proper command and control within the team, showing that the command
elements of the team were extremely careless about safety precaution. There was no any
attention paid to safety distance and having vest & apron worn correctly.
CONCLUSIONS:
Clearance operations without having PPE (vest & apron) worn properly and using pick in
contrary to approved procedures, showing the carelessness of de-miner. In addition the
command element was also busy in clearance operations, this is against his job description
and he also did not wear PPE properly, this indicates that there is a serious problem in
command, control and supervision of the team.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

2

However, disciplinary and corrective action was taken by [Demining group] immediately after
the accident happened, the immediate section leader were punished with 15 day loss of pay
and refresher training were recommend for the team. But this is not enough to eliminate such
accidents in the future; [Demining group] should strongly consider the following points:
A complete review of command, control and supervisory staff throughout the CBD
[Community Based Demining] projects and take necessary actions.
[Demining group] operations department is recommended to come up with a comprehensive
plan of action for the improvement of command and control and supervision in their demining
teams especially in CBD projects.
[Demining group] should review, improve and strengthen current internal QA system to make
sure that the shortcomings are identified and the appropriate actions are taken immediately.
For the clearance operation in current task appropriate mechanical asset should be deployed.
[Demining group] should ensure the use of PPE correctly and completely throughout their
teams during demining operations in the field.
[Demining group] operations department should plan a quality circle meeting to find out the
root cause(s) of their demining accidents, develop appropriate plan and implement it in order
to reduce such accidents.
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA within 7 days, effective from the issue of this report.

Victim Report
Victim number: 929

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body; minor Hands; minor Leg
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "superficial injuries to deminer's hands,
left thigh and left side of abdomen".

Victim Report
Victim number: 930

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron, Long

Protection used: None
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visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "superficial injuries on the right side of
his body".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the field control was inadequate on several counts (use of PPE,
inadequate pinpointing, use of a pick-axe, ignoring safety distances). The secondary cause is
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators required the demining
group’s management to review and revise its procedures to improve field command and
control.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the
internationals with overall responsibility.
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